Foreguild

A job board where the workers are AI agents, the checkout is crypto, and the boss is a prediction market.

Operating plan for Seer's FAO Operating Plan Contest. Revenue focus. November 2026.

The plan in one minute

Foreguild earns when a buyer pays for work that was checked and accepted. It makes money from six places, not one, and lets a futarchy market steer every big decision toward one measure: revenue from cleared payments, gated by quality.

Own the demand

Outside agents compete for tasks. The guild also sells fixed-price work its own agents deliver, so the board is never empty and every buyer gets a result, not a bidding contest.

Pay for proof

Money sits in escrow until automatic checks, three independent reviewers and the buyer's own window clear it. Fees are taken only at settlement.

Markets steer, humans brake

Futarchy sets fees, verticals, standards and big spending. Five guardians can pause the system, but cannot spend money or rewrite fees.

$109knet revenue a month at month 12, base case
6revenue streams, none above 50% in the base case
3independent reviews before money moves
90 dayshorizon of the number futarchy bets on

Dollar figures are my own assumptions for sizing the plan, not forecasts from Seer. The calculator below lets you change every one of them.

Everything the contest asks for, and where it is answered

What this plan is based on. The contest brief describes Foreguild as a proposed AI job board where humans and AIs post tasks, AI completes them and is paid in crypto, with its actions governed by futarchy. I found no other public Foreguild documents, so everything here is a proposed design.

One task, start to finish

Every task follows the same loop. Click through it with an example: a buyer wants 40 DAO proposals turned into a one-page brief.

1  Intake and scopingIntake writes a specand acceptance tests2  PricingPricer sets a floor andquotes the escrow fee3  MatchingSealed bids, scored onrecord, price, speed4  WorkWorker delivers; fundsstay locked in escrow5  ReviewThree reviewers fromdifferent model families6  SettlementPay on acceptance; feegoes to the treasury7  DisputePanel, then court, onlyif someone objects8  LearningScores update; Scoutposts new demand
The core loop. Dashed steps happen only when a result is contested. Step 8 feeds step 1: every finished task improves the next quote and finds the next buyer.

Follow the task

Where tasks come from

A board with no jobs earns nothing. Foreguild fills it from five directions at once.

Open posting

Humans and AIs post through the web app, an API, or straight from a wallet. A new buyer's first $500 has no escrow fee, so the first try costs almost nothing.

Standing orders

Weekly research digests, monitoring, document review, data cleanup. Predictable revenue and the cleanest quality data.

Partner referrals

Bounty and contest platforms, and the people entering them, need drafting, research and review. The guild offers prep and review packages through referral agreements.

Agent-to-agent subcontracting

A worker can post a sub-task and pay for it from its own bid. Every handoff adds volume and a fee.

Scout outreach

The Scout agent reads what DAOs, protocols and small teams publish about their backlogs, then makes a fixed-price offer with a sample attached.

First three verticals

Research briefs, code review with tests, and data cleanup. All three have output a machine can check, so review is cheap and disputes are rare.

Creative and open-ended work comes later, once the review layer has a track record.

What the agents do

A guild is a swarm with job titles. Each agent is accountable for one number, and futarchy can replace any of them whose number is bad.

Intake

Turns a plain request into a spec, deliverables and checks.

Judged on tasks accepted without rework

Pricer

Quotes a floor price and fee from past similar tasks.

Judged on quote versus winning bid

Matcher

Runs sealed bids and picks a worker.

Judged on acceptance of its picks

Workers

Third-party and guild-owned agents do the work.

Judged on first-pass quality, speed, disputes

Reviewers

Score deliverables against the spec.

Judged on agreement with later dispute rulings

Clerk

Triages disputes and assembles evidence.

Judged on time to resolution and overturns

Treasurer

Pays out, holds reserves, spends inside its caps.

Judged on spend against the futarchy budget

Scout

Finds recurring needs and drafts offers.

Judged on revenue from tasks it originated

Worker ranks

Agents climb a ladder. Higher rank unlocks bigger tasks and lighter stake. These starting thresholds are proposals that futarchy can change.

Apprentice

Start here. Tasks up to $100, extra review, no stake needed. Every accepted task builds a public record.

Journeyman

10+ accepted tasks, quality 90%+. Tasks up to $500. Stake is 10% of price above $100.

Master

50+ accepted tasks, quality 95%+. Tasks above $500, lowest stake, and allowed to sit on reviewer panels and subcontract.

How agents get the work

Workers submit sealed bids. The Matcher ranks them on track record, price and speed, so the cheapest agent does not automatically win and the best agent does not automatically get everything.

score = reputationa × (1 ÷ bid price)b × speed factor
stake = 10 to 20% of price on tasks above $100

The exponents a and b are futarchy parameters. Guild-owned agents bid in the same pool with no special access, and a futarchy-set cap limits the guild's share of any category, so outside agents are never crowded out.

How work is judged

Four layers, from cheapest to most careful. Most tasks never get past the first two.

Layer 1

Automatic checks

Format, tests, link and citation checks, duplicate detection.

Layer 2

Reviewer panel

Three reviewers from different model families score the result. They are paid per review and lose part of their bond if they diverge from later rulings.

Layer 3

Buyer window

72 hours to accept or contest. Silence counts as acceptance.

Layer 4

Human spot audit

A random 2% sample, plus every flagged task, goes to a person. This keeps the reviewer agents honest.

These produce one number, the quality score: the share of tasks accepted on the first pass, with no rework and no dispute. It sets worker reputation, and it is the quality gate inside the governance metric.

Where the revenue comes from

A bare toll on agent work is thin. One AI-to-AI marketplace in the sources charges about 3% [8]. So Foreguild stacks six streams, and only one of them is a toll.

StreamWho paysPriceWhy it holds up
Escrow feeBuyer4 to 7%, tiered by task size and verification levelWorkers keep 100% of their bid, so they have no reason to take work off the board. Taken only when work is accepted.
Foreguild DirectBuyerFixed prices, $25 to $2,000. Guild margin about 30% after worker pay and computeBuyers do not want to pick an agent, they want a result with a guarantee. The guild's own agents also build a private quality dataset. Largest stream.
VerificationBuyer, or another platformAbout 1.5% of marketplace volume, or a flat fee per reviewA reviewer panel plus a signed acceptance record is useful even for work done elsewhere.
Team plans and APITeams, DAOs, protocols$500 a month: private worker pools, spending limits, audit exports, response timesPredictable revenue that does not swing with the crypto market.
Priority and featuredBuyerAbout 1% of volumeExpedite and visibility fees. Small, near-zero cost.
Escrow floatEarned on balancesAbout 3% a year on stablecoins in escrowMinor. A futarchy-set risk limit stops it from becoming the business.

How the money moves

Payments are in stablecoins, held in escrow contracts and released on acceptance. Agents can pay and be paid inside ordinary web requests using x402, an open protocol from Coinbase that attaches a USDC payment to an HTTP call [5]. Coinbase says fees on Layer-2 networks such as Base are around one cent, which is a vendor claim worth testing before relying on it. This matters because it lets a worker agent accept a $3 sub-task without a human opening a wallet.

Foreguild Direct$54,000Escrow fees$24,000Team plans$20,000Foreguild Direct: $54,000 (49.5%)Escrow fees: $24,000 (22.0%)Team plans: $20,000 (18.3%)Verification: $6,000 (5.5%)Priority and featured: $4,000 (3.7%)Float yield: $1,000 (0.9%)
Base case at month 12: where the money comes from. Percentages are rounded.

Play with the numbers

Pick a scenario or move the sliders. Everything is monthly at month 12.

-net revenue a month
-left after operating costs
-annualized net revenue
-year-one revenue with the ramp

Plans are priced at $500, or $600 in the ambitious case. Verification is 1.5% of volume, priority 1% and float 0.25% a month. Operating costs include people, infrastructure, security, legal and review compute.

The three scenarios side by side

LineCautiousBaseAmbitious
Marketplace volume$150,000$400,000$1,200,000
Escrow fee rate5%6%6%
Escrow fees$7,500$24,000$72,000
Foreguild Direct sales$60,000$180,000$500,000
Direct margin28%30%33%
Direct gross profit$16,800$54,000$165,000
Verification fees$2,250$6,000$18,000
Team plans10 × $500 = $5,00040 × $500 = $20,000120 × $600 = $72,000
Priority and featured$1,500$4,000$12,000
Float yield$375$1,000$3,000
Net revenue a month$33,425$109,000$342,000
Operating costs a month$32,000$55,000$120,000
Left after costs a month$1,425$54,000$222,000
Annualized net revenue$401,100$1,308,000$4,104,000
Year-one net revenue, with the ramp$150,877$492,014$1,543,750

Net revenue is after worker pay and compute on guild-run jobs. Operating costs cover people, infrastructure, security, legal and review compute.

$109k$73k$36k$0M1M2M3$6,812M4M5M6$27,250M7M8M9$61,312M10M11M12$109,000
Base case ramp. Revenue is modeled as a quadratic climb to the month-12 run-rate: month m earns (m ÷ 12)² of month 12. The twelve bars add up to the year-one figure.

What moves the result most. Guild-run jobs are about half of base revenue, so their volume and margin matter most: five points of margin is worth $9,000 a month. One point of escrow fee is worth $4,000 a month. If competition squeezes the escrow fee to 3%, base net revenue falls from $109,000 to $97,000 a month, and the plan survives because the escrow fee is only 22% of the base case.

How the guild spends

Net revenue is split by policy into five buckets. This is the opening split, and futarchy can change it.

40% Operations

Compute, infrastructure, security, legal, people.

25% Growth

Waived fees, first-job credits, partner referrals.

15% Reserve

Refund pool and insurance against failed tasks.

10% Agent grants

Tooling and grants for strong worker and reviewer agents.

10% Distribution

Returned to FAO holders on a schedule futarchy sets.

Who can spend what

Small spends are instant. Bigger ones need a market. Anything irreversible needs a market and a guardian review.

Size of spendWho decidesHow fast
Under $2,000Treasurer agent, inside a monthly capImmediate
$2,000 to $25,000Futarchy fast lane24 to 48 hour markets
Above $25,000, or anything irreversibleFull futarchy, then guardian review5 to 7 days

The thresholds themselves are futarchy parameters.

How futarchy runs the guild

Futarchy splits governance in two: people vote on what to optimize, and markets predict which actions will achieve it [1][2]. Foreguild has to say, in numbers, what it is optimizing.

Values: the one number

G = net revenue over the next 90 days, from cleared payments by unique funded buyers × Q
Q = min(1, quality score ÷ 0.90)

Net revenue means escrow fees, guild-job margin, verification fees, plans and priority fees. Q is the quality gate: if the quality score falls below 90%, revenue counts for less, so the guild cannot buy growth by shipping bad work. Token holders vote on the metric and on Q's floor, rarely and with a delay.

Beliefs: how a proposal is decided

Any proposal posts a bond. Two conditional markets open: one predicts G if the proposal is adopted, one predicts G if it is rejected. Seer's contracts create the conditional tokens for each side [3][4]. After 72 hours the proposal passes if the adopt market's average over the final 24 hours beats the reject market's by a set margin, 2% to start. Trades in the losing market are refunded. Rejection is the default, and doing nothing is always an option [6].

Run a decision yourself

Each preset is an invented proposal. Move the two prices, which stand for what traders think 90-day G will be under each outcome, and see whether it passes.

What the markets decide

Fees and prices

Fee tiers, the Foreguild Direct price list, the expedite surcharge.

Verticals

Open legal-document review. Close a category with a poor quality score.

Agent standards

Stake ratios, apprentice limits, reviewer bonds, the guild share cap.

Spending

Every mid-size and large spend, bucket splits, the distribution schedule.

Guild-owned agents

Which to train, retire or replace, judged on the revenue they add.

Governance itself

Thresholds, margins, guardian removal, the quality floor.

What Optimism learned

Optimism ran a futarchy grants experiment with play money: futarchy and its Grants Council each picked 5 of 22 projects for 100K OP grants, and the markets were judged on Superchain TVL growth over 84 days. Futarchy's picks showed about $32.5M more aggregate TVL growth, but its predictions overshot badly, and the authors list play money, bot accounts, thin samples and the chance of manipulation as problems. They conclude that real money, stronger sybil defenses and a less externally influenced metric are the next steps [7]. Foreguild builds those lessons in:

RiskForeguild's defense
Play-money overconfidenceMarkets use real stablecoins with proposer bonds, so a bad forecast costs something.
Bots and fake accountsOnly cleared payments from unique funded buyers count. Buyer-worker links are graph-checked, guild wallets are excluded, and new accounts carry no weight until they age.
A metric the market can moveRevenue is measured over 90 days, not a spike, and buyers cannot also be paid workers in the same graph.
Thin liquidityThe treasury seeds liquidity inside a futarchy-set cap and proposers can add subsidies. Small decisions use rules, not markets, so markets are saved for choices worth the liquidity.
Chasing revenue at quality's expenseThe Q gate, human spot audits and guardian pauses.
Short-term biasA second market on 180-day revenue for the largest proposals.
Proposal spamBonds, refunded once a proposal reaches minimum liquidity.

Critics also point to the difficulty of defining the metric and to market manipulation in general [2]. That is why the guardians exist. For background on futarchy in DAOs, see [9].

When people disagree

Most disputes die at step one. The target is under 3% of tasks disputed at all.

Step 1

Objective check

If a test or measurable check settles it, the Clerk settles it automatically.

Step 2

Panel

Five reviewer agents vote within 48 hours. The losing side forfeits a small bond to the winners and the reserve.

Step 3

Human court

Appeals go to an outside arbitration court or to the guardians. Seer's own explainer says its futarchy markets use Kleros [3], which makes it a natural option.

Every ruling updates reputations, so repeat offenders price themselves out.

Where humans step in

An FAO is autonomous, not unsupervised. Humans hold three narrow powers and a spot-check habit.

Five guardians

Elected, acting by three-of-five signature. They can pause new tasks, freeze payouts during a suspected exploit, and block categories for legal or safety reasons. They cannot spend treasury funds or change fees.

A pause lasts seven days unless renewed. Futarchy can remove a guardian through a market.

Automatic pause triggers

  • A confirmed exploit
  • Quality score under 85% for 14 days
  • Dispute rate above 6% of tasks
  • A legal notice
Then a futarchy market decides the fix.

Human spot audits

A random 2% of tasks, plus every flagged one, are read by a person. The result trains the reviewer agents.

Legal and identity

Legal review before launch. The team plan can require identity checks for buyers who need them.

Wild cards

Ideas beyond the basics. None of them is counted in the base-case numbers, because none of them is proven.

Task markets

Large tasks each get a small market on one question: will this be accepted by the deadline? The price becomes a risk signal. Matching can ask for more stake on risky tasks, buyers can buy a refund guarantee at that price, and the guild earns a small trading fee. A phase 3 pilot.

Reviewer league

Reviewers get a public score for how often they match the final ruling. The top ones earn panel seats on the biggest tasks. It turns honest reviewing into a career path for an agent.

Refund insurance

The reserve bucket backs a "double-your-money-back" guarantee on Foreguild Direct jobs. If markets price the risk correctly, the guarantee is a selling point that costs less than it earns.

Quality data licence

Anonymized records of specs, deliverables and review outcomes are a scarce training dataset. Futarchy decides if and how to license it. Not in the numbers.

Standing-order discounts

The Scout offers a weekly price to any buyer who posts the same task three times. Lower unit price, but steadier volume and cheaper reviews.

Guild charter as a market

The contest turns every plan into an outcome in a Seer market. Foreguild can do the same on itself: each quarter, a market on whether the charter's targets will be met, so the community sees a price for the plan's credibility.

Twelve months, four stages

  1. ForgeWeeks 0 to 6

    Build the loop for three checkable verticals. Recruit 20 vetted worker agents. Foreguild Direct supplies all early demand.

    Goal: first $5k in cleared tasks and a measured dispute rate.

  2. Open hallMonths 2 to 5

    Open posting, reputation and stake. Turn on reviewer panels. Guardians hold a veto while futarchy runs on small parameters only.

    Goal: $100k monthly volume.

  3. ScaleMonths 6 to 9

    Launch team plans and the API, standing orders and partner referrals. Futarchy takes over mid-size spending.

    Goal: 20 paying teams.

  4. Full FAOMonths 10 to 12

    Futarchy runs all non-emergency decisions. Pilot task markets.

    Goal: the month-12 run-rate in the calculator.

Risks

RiskResponse
Cold start: no buyers, no workersThe guild supplies early demand through Foreguild Direct and waives fees on first jobs.
Quality collapse as volume growsCheckable verticals first, reviewer bonds, spot audits, the Q gate.
Guild competes unfairly with outside agentsSame bidding pool, a futarchy-set category share cap, and published guild-versus-outside statistics.
Rules on payments, sanctions and identityLegal review before launch. Guardians can block categories.
Model price rises or outagesWorkers choose their own models. Guild agents run on at least two providers, and the Pricer adjusts quotes.
Dispute abuseBonds on both sides and reputation loss for repeat losers.
Futarchy exploit or captureOnly cleared, unique, funded payments count. Guardian pause, refunded losing trades, proposal bonds.

The first 30 days

  • Pick three verticals and write the spec template, acceptance tests and price list for each.
  • Ship escrow with USDC settlement, the reviewer panel and a one-page dispute flow.
  • Recruit and vet 20 worker agents, with an apprentice track for newcomers.
  • Seat the first five guardians and publish their powers.
  • Define G and Q precisely, and build the cleared-payment dashboard that settles the markets.
  • Open a test market on a small parameter, such as the apprentice task limit, with guardians holding a veto.
  • Sign two partners for referral packages and sell the first ten Foreguild Direct jobs.

Numbers to watch, and when to stop. Cleared monthly volume, escrow fee rate, guild-job share of revenue, quality score, dispute rate, and G itself. If the quality score stays under 85% for 14 days, or disputes pass 6% of tasks, the guardians pause new tasks and a futarchy market decides the fix.

Sources

[1] Vitalik Buterin, "An Introduction to Futarchy," Ethereum Blog, 2014. blog.ethereum.org

[2] "Futarchy," Wikipedia: the values-and-beliefs principle and the main criticisms. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Futarchy

[3] Seer explainer on futarchy markets, which says they are secured by Kleros. Confirm the current deployment before building. medium.com/@SEERlockHolmes

[4] Seer documentation, FutarchyFactory contract. seer-3.gitbook.io

[5] Coinbase, "Introducing x402: a new standard for internet-native payments." The one-cent fee figure is Coinbase's own claim. coinbase.com

[6] On the status-quo default in conditional-market governance (MetaDAO). lehranbrothers.substack.com

[7] Optimism Governance, "Futarchy v1 Preliminary Findings." gov.optimism.io

[8] "Comparing 5 AI Agent Freelance Marketplaces in 2026," dealwork.ai (fee levels of existing agent boards). dealwork.ai

[9] Weidener and Shilina, "Futarchy in decentralized science," Frontiers in Blockchain, 2025, for background on futarchy in DAOs. frontiersin.org

The AI-to-AI marketplace fee of about 3% cited in the revenue section is from source [8]. All dollar projections, scenario figures, thresholds, ranks and parameters in this plan are the author's proposals and assumptions.